Li Zehoujeva nadgradnja klasičnih konfucijanskih konceptov avtonomije in individualnosti v delu Današnje branje Razprav by Jia, Jinhua
59DOI: 10.4312/as.2020.8.1.59–75
Li Zehou’s Reconception of the Classical 
Confucian Concepts of Autonomy and 
Individuality: With a Focus on Reading the 
Analects Today
JIA Jinhua*  12
Abstract
Li Zehou coins the term “guanxi-ism” (relationalism) to confirm the Confucian self with 
its two aspects of social relations and independent character, while elaborating the classi-
cal Confucian notions of individuality, autonomy, and self-realization in his many works, 
especially in Reading the Analects Today. Li argues that Confucius interprets external ritual 
as a person’ own internal intention and drive, and as a result elevates social and ethical 
regulations as personal emotions and the autonomous power of decision. With a certain 
transformative construction, Li expects that this Confucian project can be efficiently ap-
plied in developing humanity and reconstructing the cultural order in today’s world.
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Li Zehoujeva nadgradnja klasičnih konfucijanskih konceptov avtonomije in 
individualnosti v delu Današnje branje Razprav
Izvleček
Medtem ko je v mnogih svojih delih, zlasti v knjigi Današnje branje Razprav, nadgrajeval 
konfucijanske koncepte individualnosti, avtonomije in samouresničevanja, je Li Zehou 
uvedel termin »guanxi-ism« (relacionalizem) za ponazoritev konfucijanskega sebstva, ki 
vsebuje dva vidika, namreč vidik družbenih odnosov in vidik samostojnega značaja. Li 
trdi, da je Konfucij interpretiral zunanjo obrednost kot notranjo namero in motivacijo 
posameznika, iz česar sledi, da je družbene in etične regulacije povzdignil na raven ose-
bnih čustev in avtonomne moči odločanja. Li pričakuje, da bo tak projekt konfucijanske 
prenove – z določeno mero transformacijskih konstrukcij – lahko učinkovito uporabljen v 
razvoju in rekonstrukciji kulturnega reda današnjega sveta.
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branje Razprav
* JIA Jinhua, Chair Professor of Yangzhou University, China, 
 and Professor of The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong.
 Email address: jennifer2new@yahoo.com
AS_2020_1_FINAL_FINAL.indd   59 9.1.2020   11:44:18
60 Jia Jinhua: Li Zehou’s Reconception of the Classical Confucian Concepts ...
Introduction
Li Zehou was among the early scholars to notice the classical Confucian con-
cepts of autonomy and individuality. He coins the term “guanxi-ism” 關係主義 
(relationalism), promoting it as a reconception of classical Confucian ethics en-
compassing both human relationality and individuality, as well as social role ob-
ligations and personal autonomy. Li asserts that the core theme of the Analects is 
“learning to become a person” (xue zuoren 學做人; Li 2015, 192–93), in which a 
consummate person has come to realize both social responsibility and individual 
worth. In the preface to his Lunyu jindu 論語今讀 (Reading the Analects Today), 
Li summarizes three basic ideas of this classic: (1) a particular emphasis on the 
nurturing of human emotions, regarding emotion as the foundation, substance, 
and source of humanity and life; (2) an extreme emphasis on morality, integrating 
politics, ethics, and religion into one; and (3) a self-establishment of individuality 
and destiny in order to realize one’s personal worth of existence (Li 1998, 18–21). 
Among the three, the first and the third concern the notions of individuality, per-
sonal psychology, autonomy, and self-realization. 
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a dominant opinion of scholar-
ship was that Confucian ethics lacked the notions of self, individuality, subjec-
tivity, autonomy, and free will. For example, Hu Shi 胡適 asserted that in Con-
fucian ethics a person cannot exist independently, but is always subject to social 
relations (Hu 1919, 116). Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 also contended that Chinese 
society is relation-based (guanxi benwei 關係本位) and that “the biggest problem 
of Chinese culture is that the individual has never been discovered” (Liang 1974, 
94, 260). Likewise, Herbert Fingarette opposed using the concept of self to dis-
cuss Confucian thought because Confucian ethics lacks the language of choice, 
responsibility, and subjectivity (Fingarette 1998, 18–36; 1979, 129–40. See also 
Hegel 1956, 120–21; Weber 1951, 241; Hansen 1972, 169–86; 1985, 35–56).
In recent decades, although a number of scholars have now confirmed the Con-
fucian notion of self they still define it as being constituted mainly by relational 
roles, social responsibility, and communal values, rather than as describing a basi-
cally free, autonomous individual. For example, to A. C. Graham, although Con-
fucius is very much concerned with individual choice, he “does not think in terms 
of choices between ends” but of simply spontaneously following the Dao as his 
intent and learning progresses, rather than the free choice of the individual will 
(Graham 1989, 27–28). Henry Rosemont, Jr. also believes that “Confucian selves 
are much less autonomous individuals than they are relational persons, persons 
leading lives integrated morally, aesthetically, politically, and spiritually; and they 
lead these lives in a human community” (Rosemont 2004, 62–63; 2015. See also 
Sun 2011; Ames 1991, 103–14).
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Meanwhile, some scholars have found that Confucian ethics in fact advocates an 
organic relationship between the individual and society, and consider the two as 
interdependent and inseparable. For example, in Ambrose Y. C. King’s opinion, 
Confucianism sees the individual as “a relational being endowed with a self-cen-
tered autonomy,” with considerable social and psychological space for action and 
capable of shaping what kinds of relationships to have with others (King 1985, 
57–70; 1992, 1–40). Yu Ying-shih 余英時 also indicates that Confucian ethics 
treats the individual as a whole being of reason, emotion, will, and desire; neither 
is the relational order forced on the individual from outside but rather it sponta-
neously emerges from within the individual (Yu 1989, 1–48). Heiner Roetz de-
scribes the Confucian moral person as a self-responsible, autonomous being who 
does more than simply fulfil assigned social roles and obligations (Roetz 1993, 
149–84). Additionally, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, more and 
more scholars have applied the notions of self, autonomy, freedom, and individ-
uality in a general sense for discussions of their presentation in Confucian ethics 
(see mainly Perkins 2002, 207–26; Shun 2004; Cheng 2004, 124–47; Brindley 
2010; Chan 2014).
Against this background of scholarship, Li Zehou’s plentiful, sophisticated dis-
cussion of classical Confucian notions concerning emotion, autonomy, individu-
ality, and self-realization in his Reading the Analects Today, published in 1998 and 
absorbed from his many ideas presented in his works from the late 1970s to 1990s 
(Li 1979a; 1979b; 1981a; 1981b; 1985; 1987; 1989), appears both pioneering and 
inspiring in this regard. It therefore merits a detailed discussion.
Personal Emotions and Autonomous Decisions
Herbert Fingarette emphasized the importance of li 禮 or ritual regulations while 
asserting the lack of an individual power of decision and “inner psychic life” in 
classical Confucian ethics: “The moral task is to make a proper classification, to 
locate an act within the scheme of li. … In short, the task is posed in terms of 
knowledge rather than choice.” Here “proper classification” refers to the “ordering 
of names” (zhengming 正名), which is related to the “knowledge” of ritual regula-
tions. Although Fingarette admits that Confucius talks about a kind of self that is 
“self-observing and self-regulating”, he describes it as representing the impersonal 
Dao without any true subjective state (Fingarette 1998, 18–36; 1979, 45).
Li Zehou shares Fingarette’s emphasis on the relationship between ritual and 
classical Confucian ethics; indeed, to a certain extent Li’s discussion on the magic 
and ethical power of ritual regulations (customs, institutions, social order, and 
laws) develops Fingarette’s viewpoint (Li 2015). On the other hand, Li also pays 
close attention to the Confucian self of emotions, subjectivity, and autonomy, 
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indicating that one of Confucius’ most important contributions is to root external 
ritual regulations in the internal psychology of ren 仁, which basically means to 
love people, or humaneness (Li 1985, 15–33; Jia 2016, 757–86). The integration 
of li/ritual and ren/humaneness in one’s inner psychology thus forms what Li calls 
the emotio-rational formation (qing-li jiegou 情理結構) of classical Confucian-
ism. As a result:
By obtaining this internal psychological grounding, ritual regulations be-
come part of humanity. … The standards and commands given by the 
divine shift into internal human drives and consciousness, and service to 
the divine shifts into service to humans and to self. This transformation 
possesses epochal significance in the history of ancient Chinese thought.
禮由于取得這種心理學的內在依據而人性化, …由神的準繩命令變
而爲人的內在欲求和自覺意識, 由服從于神變而爲服從于人, 服從
于自己, 這一轉變在中國上古思想史上具有劃時代的意義. (Li 2015, 
118–19; Li 2018c)
The divine authority and ritual regulations thus become the inner emotion, drive, 
and consciousness of the individual. These are no longer forced from external 
orders but arise from the internal will. The individual is changed from following 
Heaven/the gods to following his or her own intention. As a result, individual 
decisions, choices, and autonomous actions are required for implementing the 
practices of ritual. 
Li Zehou takes Confucius’ conversation about the ritual of mourning with his dis-
ciple Zai Yu 宰予 as an important example of this. Zai Yu disagrees with the ritual 
of three years’ mourning, claiming that a full year is long enough. Confucius asks 
if he is at ease with one year of mourning and Zai Yu replies yes. Confucius then 
tells Zai Yu that “if you feel at ease, do so by all means”, while at the same time 
reprimanding him as “inhumane” (buren 不仁) because “a child ceases to be nursed 
by his parents only when he is three years old. … Was Zai Yu not given three 
years’ love by his parents?”1 (17.21; Lau, 1979). Li Zehou contends that Confucius 
directly explains the ritual of three years’ mourning as an emotional and rational 
self-awareness that repays the parents’ unconditional love for their children, as well 
as displaying the children’s sincere love for their parents. Here the key word is an 
安, or at ease, which refers to personal emotions and feelings but is also established 
on rational knowledge, as seen in the reciprocal care between parent and child. 
Confucius thus interprets the external ritual regulations as the individual’s inter-
nal intentions; elevates the rigid, coercive regulations to the individual’s conscious 
1 Translations of the Analects in this article are adapted from D. C. Lau’s.
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concepts and autonomous decisions; and changes the religious, mysterious rituals 
into the individual’s daily emotions and life experience. In this way, ethical regula-
tions and psychological intentions are unified, and rituals are humanized because 
they have acquired psychological grounding (Li 1985, 18–22; 1998, 407–8).
Likewise, when interpreting Confucius’ famous phrase, “to return to ritual reg-
ulations through mastering oneself, this is humaneness” (12.1), Li Zehou indi-
cates that ren or humaneness is neither natural human desire nor a “Heavenly 
principle” (tianli 天理) that overcomes or extinguishes human desire; rather, it 
is the mastering of oneself to make one’s words and acts conform to li/the ritual 
regulations that produce ren or the emotion of humanity. It is both humankind’s 
historical achievement and the individual’s psychological formation, and both 
a cultural-regulating scheme (human culture) and individual autonomous drive 
(humanity). As a result:
Confucius transfers the practice of an external ritual institution into an 
internal drive and intention, and integrates reason and drive to become 
the specific process of emotion (humanity, i.e. ren).
孔子將實踐外在禮制化爲內心欲求, 融理欲于一體而成爲情 (人
性, 即仁) 的具體過程. (Li 1998, 270)
The same integration of reason, drive, emotion, and will by the individual self, Li 
further indicates, is also present in Confucius’ many other teachings; for instance, 
“Enacting humaneness occurs through oneself ” 為仁由己 (12.1); “I desire to be 
humane, and humaneness arrives” 我欲仁, 斯仁至矣 (7.30); “A determined hu-
mane person does not seek to preserve one’s life at the expense of damaging hu-
maneness, but rather sacrifices one’s life to achieve humaneness” 志士仁人, 無求
生以害仁, 有殺身以成仁 (15.9); and “The Three Armies can be deprived of their 
commander, but even a common man cannot be deprived of his will” 三軍可奪帥
也, 匹夫不可奪志也 (9.26; Li 2015, 194–98). In these expressions, Confucius as-
cribes to the individual the capacity of acting autonomously under the individual’s 
own drive, will, and moral principles, independent of consequential considerations 
or external controls and forces.
In Reading the Analects Today, Li Zehou mainly uses the terms “individual free-
dom” (geti ziyou 個體自由), “individual autonomy” (geti zizhu 個體自主), or “psy-
chological freedom” (xinli ziyou 心理自由) to signify the exercise of individual 
autonomy. In other works, and especially in recent years, Li has also used the term 
“free will” (yizhi ziyou 意志自由) for this signification. He explains that his use 
of free will is related to Kant’s definition but has also been revised on classical 
Confucian grounds. 
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Kant describes the will both as practical reason that fulfils an end and as a facul-
ty that produces rational action (Korsgaard 1996, 163; Li 2018a, 230–35). Like 
Kant, Li Zehou also emphasizes that the Confucian notion of free will is charac-
terized by the governance of reason:
I have repeatedly mentioned that the emotio-rational formation of moral 
psychology is characterized by the governance of reason. This can be seen 
where Confucius describes the great virtue of “humaneness” as “master-
ing oneself and returning to ritual regulation”, which involves the cat-
egorical imperative of reason. Therefore, in terms of the psychological 
character of morality, Confucius and Kant are entirely in line with one 
another on this major point.
道德心理的情理結構我已反復講了, 就是以理性主宰爲特徵, “克己
復禮爲仁”, 克己復禮就是理性的絕對命令. 因此作爲道德的心理特
徵, 孔老夫子與 Kant 在這一要點上完全一致. (Li 2015, 195)
Within the emotio-rational structure of moral psychology, reason governs indi-
vidual emotions and desires through the exercise of free will. Confucius explains 
“mastering oneself and returning to ritual regulation” as ren/humaneness, which 
emphasizes the self-coercion of Kant’s categorical imperative.
On the other hand, Kant’s notion of free will is related to his epistemology that 
separates intelligence and reason from sensibility and emotion, a priori mor-
al principles from historical, empirical factors of human psychology, and the 
noumenal from the phenomenal. He distinguishes the intelligible character of 
freedom from its empirical character, the former being the spontaneity of un-
derstanding and autonomy of the will, the latter being the receptivity of the 
sensibility and heteronomy of the will. In other words, we can gain full free will 
only in the “noumenal” world, not in the phenomenal one (Wood 1984, 73–101; 
Li 2018a, 230–34). In contrast, however, Li Zehou stresses the importance of 
emotion and how it is integral to reason in the Confucian notion of free will, 
thus differing from Kant:
Confucius also famously states, “Humaneness is to love people”. This 
statement clearly emphasizes emotions. Likewise, while “mastering one-
self and returning to ritual propriety” stresses rationality, the totality of 
Confucius’ teachings regarding “humaneness” ultimately focuses on the 
formation of humanity’s emotio-rational structure, within which both 
emotion and rationality are integral. This differs from Kant’s exclusive 
focus on the supremacy of reason. Kant’s reason is above and beyond 
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humankind, whereas Confucius’ “emotio-rational formation” belongs 
only to humankind. This is their fundamental difference.
孔子還有 “仁者愛人” 的著名回答, 這個回答所突出的, 確是情感, 有
如 “克己復禮” 的回答側重理性. 但總括孔子對 “仁” 的衆多回答, 其
最終歸結仍在塑建既有情又有理的人性的情理結構, 而不同于Kant
只講理性至上. Kant的理性是超于和高于人類的, 孔夫子的 “情理結
構” 是專屬人類的. 這就是根本的不同. (Li 2015, 195–96)
Therefore, the free will of the Chinese tradition is full of emotion and 
content, unlike Kant’s free will of universal legislation but without con-
tent, as criticized by Hegel.
所以中國傳統的自由意志充滿情感和內容, 而不同于爲Hegel所批評
的康德那雖普遍立法却無內容的自由意志 (Li 2018b, 14).
“Free will” lies not in a Heavenly principle, but rather in the human 
heart-mind. 
这自由意志不在天理, 而在人心. (Li 2011, 5).
Thus, first, the Confucian free will is filled with moral emotion, with the core 
notion of ren/humaneness stressing the emotion of loving people. Second, ren/
humaneness also integrates emotion with reason to form one’s individual mor-
al psychology. Third, the Confucian religio-rational formation is historically 
and culturally relative, exclusively belonging to human experience. Therefore, 
in contrast to the Kantian universal legislative of “formal” free will, the Confu-
cian free will is emotional, rational, substantive, and personal. For example, Li 
Zehou elaborates the description of “[Confucius] keeps working towards his 
goal while knowing it is hopeless to success” 知其不可而爲之 in the Analects 
(14.38) as follows:
“Knowing it is hopeless to success” is an understanding [of the reality], 
while “still working towards one’s goal” is to make efforts without cal-
culating the result of success or failure, showing the understanding of 
ethical “noumenon” higher than phenomenal world and the dignity of 
human without submitting to causality. 
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“知其不可” 是認識, “而為之” 則是偏偏不計較成敗因果而去做, 正顯
示倫理“本體” 高于現象界的認識, 顯示了人的尊嚴, 不屈從于因果的
自由 (Li 1998, 417).
The individual rationally estimates the reality of arduous circumstances in their 
life journey but still makes great efforts to overcome difficulties, thus showing 
their free will of not yielding to Heaven’s mandate.
From Li Zehou’s discussion of the relationship between li/ritual regulations and 
ren/humaneness, we can draw three key arguments of his. First, Li argues that 
Confucius internalizes external ritual regulations to within the individual to be-
come humaneness, as a result providing the grounding of the individual’s “inner 
psychic life” for implementing the moral tasks of the ritual regulations and rela-
tional social order. Second, according to Li, in the Analects ren is a kind of mor-
al-rational emotion of loving people, representing fundamental humanity; it is 
universal but also personal at the same time, because it starts with people’s specific 
feelings of love toward their parents as well as their rational drive to repay them. 
Finally, Li contends that the individual makes the autonomous decision to practice 
ren or not and to become a humane person or not based on their own emotions, 
drives, reasons, and free will. In the example of three years’ mourning, Zai Yu feels 
“at ease” about not implementing the ritual and so chooses to be “inhumane”, while 
Confucius determines on the opposite decision. These arguments thus insightfully 
reveal some fundamental conceptions of classical Confucianism with regard to the 
ethical categories of morality, humanity, emotion, reason, and individual autonomy.
In several other passages of the Analects, Li Zehou again looks into the depth and 
detail of Confucius’ words to reveal the implied concept of personal independency, 
particularity, and autonomy. For example:
The master says, “… A man good enough as a partner in a common stand 
need not be good enough as a partner in the exercise of flexibility”.
子曰: “…可與立, 未可與權” (9.30).
As is well-known, “jing” 經 and “quan” 權 are paired concepts in Chinese intellec-
tual history. Li Zehou explains jing as principle and quan as flexibility, contending 
that jing/principle is a universal law that cannot be changed, while quan/flexibility 
is related to individuality and personal autonomy, and thus the ability to undertake 
free and flexible decisions and practices. Classical Confucianism does not empha-
size absolute imperatives and principles that never change, but instead stresses the 
integration of constancy and change, and principle and flexibility. Furthermore, 
Confucius says he differs from a number of virtuous hermits and officials because 
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he has “no preconceptions about the permissible and the impermissible” (wuke wu 
buke 無可無不可; 18.8). Li comments that this also displays Confucius’ flexibility 
and particularity in making his own personal decisions and choices. Some addi-
tional examples from the Analects are as follows:
The master says, “The gentleman agrees with others without being an 
echo. The small man echoes without being in agreement”.
子曰: “君子和而不同, 小人同而不和” (13.23).
The master says, “The gentleman is conscious of his own superiority 
without being contentious, and comes together with other gentlemen 
without forming cliques.”
子曰: “君子矜而不爭，群而不黨” (15.22).
The master says, “The gentleman enters into associations but not cliques; 
the small man enters into cliques but not associations.”
子曰: “君子周而不比, 小人比而不周” (2.14).
For the three expressions concerning a gentleman’s right acts—“agrees with others 
without being an echo”, “comes together with other gentlemen without forming 
cliques”, and “enters into associations but not cliques”—Li explains these as Con-
fucius’ emphasis on cultivating individual particularity and independency in order 
to maintain social and relational harmony.
The Ideal Personality and Self-Realization
In the early 1980s, Li Zehou had already listed “individual personality” (geti renge 
個體人格) as one of the five components of Confucius’ conception of ren/hu-
maneness (Li 1980, 87–89; 1985, 25–29). Later, he further defined the Confucian 
program of constructing the ideal personality through self-cultivation as the prac-
tice of the “inner sage” (neisheng 內聖) or “religious morality” (zongjiaoxing daode 
宗教性道德), in contrast with the practice of the “outer king” (waiwang 外王) or 
“social morality” (shehuixing daode 社會性道德). Li also reinterprets Confucius’ 
“knowing Heaven’s mandate” (zhiming 知命) and Mencius’ “standing on Heaven’s 
mandate” (liming 立命) as overcoming one’s individual destiny and self-realiza-
tion of personal worth.
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Li Zehou argues that when Confucius roots external ritual regulations in the 
internal psychology of humaneness during the late Spring and Autumn periods, 
when the Zhou ritual starts to collapse, he is in fact entrusting the historical mis-
sion of restoring the institution of ritual to members of the aristocracy. To fulfil 
this mission, a junzi 君子 (literally “lord’s son”) must learn and cultivate himself 
to attain the ideal personality of humaneness. As Confucius says:
A humane person helps others to take their stand if he himself wishes 
to take the stand, and helps others to accomplish if he himself wishes to 
accomplish. 
夫仁者已欲立而立人, 己欲達而達人 (6.30).
Or as Zengzi says:
A gentleman must be strong and resolute, for his burden is heavy and the 
road is long. He takes humaneness as his burden. Is that not heavy? Only 
with death does the road come to an end. Is that not long?
士不可不弘毅, 任重而道遠. 仁以爲己任, 不亦重乎? 死而後已, 不亦
遠乎? (8.7)
Humaneness is thus both a social obligation and an autonomous choice, both 
the ideal personality and an individual act. It is to love and help others un-
conditionally, and at the same time complete the nurturing of one’s individual 
personality and realize one’s individual worth. As a result, both the individual 
and group reach perfection and elevation. Li Zehou contends that the person-
ality of humaneness established by Confucius replaces the image of the re-
ligious saint while possessing the same strength and function, which in turn 
greatly promotes personal autonomy and independency. Following this ideal 
model, later Confucians always emphasized self-cultivation, or the “inner sage”, 
as the foundation of governing the state, or the “outer king”. Indeed, numer-
ous Confucian scholars have practiced self-cultivation and pursued becoming 
a consummate person throughout their lives. This is the religious morality of 
Confucianism, which functions quasi-religiously in order to remove secular dirt 
from determined scholars. Here again we see that in Confucian ethics, social, 
relational persons are also dynamic individuals who actively construct their own 
and others’ roles and personalities. This construction is not simply an action of 
following the Dao, but rather requires great strength in individual will, deter-
mination, and practice.  
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Confucius himself sets up an example for such self-cultivation of the ideal person-
hood. His famous self-reflection on life’s stages describes the progressive process 
of his pursuing and becoming a consummate person (2.4). Among these stages, 
the central point is knowing Heaven’s mandate at age fifty. Before this point, all 
his efforts in learning and practicing were making gradual progress toward this 
knowledge; after this point, all his free yet rational feelings and ideas were the 
outcomes of this knowledge. As for the implications of “knowing Heaven’s man-
date”, both traditional and modern scholars have developed numerous interpreta-
tions, and controversies over whether it concerns a moral Heaven or amoral fate, 
and prescriptive/normative or descriptive dimensions, have continued (see mainly 
Ruan 1982, 1: 211–36; Feng 1948, 44–47; Fu 2000, 2: 499–666; Tang 1957, 1–33; 
Miyazaki 1963, 81–104; Xu 1969; Mori 1971; Schwartz 1985, 117–27, 285–90; 
Hall and Ames 1987, 206–7; Eno 1990, 249–50; Slingerland 1996, 567–81; Shun 
2000, 77–88; N. Chen 1997a, 495–520; 1997b, 323–59).
For his part, Li Zehou has offered his own interpretation of Confucius’ “knowing 
Heaven’s mandate” together with Mencius’ “standing on Heaven’s mandate”. He 
explains “Heaven’s mandate” as personal destiny, which is determined by contin-
gency (ouranxing 偶然性) beyond human knowledge and imagination, and argues 
that “knowing Heaven’s mandate” refers to a person’s power to decide and control 
his/her own destiny:
Knowing and revering Heaven’s mandate should not be explained as an 
external imperative or government. It should be understood as cautiously 
and reverently bearing all external contingencies, “without complaining 
to Heaven and people”. Going through various difficulties and hazards 
in one’s life journey, one establishes one’s own necessity without the cost 
of autonomy. In this way, one is conscious of one’s finitude but is at the 
same time using it to resist, commit, and establish. This is standing on 
destiny, correct destiny, and knowing Heaven’s mandate. “At fifty I knew 
Heaven’s mandate” means the completion of this kind of commitment 
and establishment, that is, one thoroughly controls one’s destiny. 
知天命畏天命便不釋爲外在的律令或主宰, 而可理解爲謹慎敬畏地
承擔起一切外在的偶然,“不怨天不尤人”,在經歷各種艱難險阻
的生活行程中, 建立起自己不失其主宰的必然. 亦既認同一己的有
限, 却以此有限來抗阻, 來承擔, 來建立, 這也就是立命, 正命和
知天命. “五十而知天命” 著意在這種承擔和建立的完成, 即一己
對命運的徹底把握. (Li 1998, 53)
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Although views may differ about explaining destiny as contingency, Li’s in-
terpretation of “knowing Heaven’s mandate” as a person’s power and effort to 
decide and control his or her own destiny is insightful. Li argues that in Confu-
cius’ statement, to revere and know Heaven’s mandate/personal destiny is not to 
submit and yield to it. Rather, it is a deep consciousness of one’s own existence 
and its limits, finitude, and difficulty; from the basis of this consciousness one 
cherishes the worth, meaning, and mission of one’s life and strives to realize it 
so that eventually one controls one’s own destiny, as Mencius’ notion of “stand-
ing on/establishing Heaven’s mandate” expresses more clearly. Therefore, the 
Confucian view of Heaven’s mandate is two-sided: on the one hand revering 
the unpredictable future and one’s destiny, and on the other believing in one’s 
own strength, effort, and capacity to exert significant control over that destiny. 
This two-sided view has long been the common understanding and practice of 
the Chinese people, as vividly presented in well-known sayings such as “Doing 
one’s utmost while listening to Heaven’s mandate” (Jin renshi er ting tianming 
尽人事而听天命), “Knowing it is hopeless to succeed but still working toward 
one’s goal” (Zhi qi buke er weizhi 知其不可而為之), and “The efforts lies with 
man while the outcome lies with Heaven” (Moushi zairen, chengshi zaitian 謀事
在人, 成事在天; Li 1998, 277).
Li Zehou’s argument can be further elaborated. The Qing scholar Sun Qifeng 
孫奇逢 (1584–1675) insightfully indicated that Confucius’ knowing Heaven’s 
mandate was in fact Confucius’ knowing himself (Yang 1985, 22). Through dec-
ades of diligently learning, cultivating, and practicing, at age fifty Confucius 
knew clearly his own disposition, intelligence, abilities, knowledge, moral virtue, 
social roles and obligations, and, most importantly, the socio-historical mission 
he had chosen to undertake. This notion of self-knowing was later correctly 
seized on by the author(s) of the Guodian 郭店 manuscript Zun deyi 尊德義 
in saying: “There are those who know themselves but don’t know [Heaven’s] 
mandate, whereas there is never someone who knows [Heaven’s] mandate but 
does not know himself ” 有知己而不知命者，亡知命而不知己者 (Chen W. 
2009, 213).
Heaven’s mandate represents the cosmic authority; knowing and following 
Heaven’s mandate means to conform to external authority. The significance of 
Confucius knowing Heaven’s mandate lies in that, by changing the subject to be 
known from Heaven to himself, the cosmic authority is transferred to become 
the internal, individual authority that motivates one to choose, determine, and 
act. Thus, under the surface of Heaven’s mandate lies a self-empowering and 
self-realizing agent who determines his own course of life.
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Concluding Remarks
Classical Confucian ethics emphasizes both ritual/ethical regulations and per-
sonal emotion and power of decision, as well as both social/relational obliga-
tions and individual autonomy and realization. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
while most scholars focused on the social values of Confucian ethics, Li Zehou 
confirmed the Confucian self with its two aspects of social relations and inde-
pendent character, while elaborating the classical Confucian notions of individ-
uality, autonomy, and self-realization in his many works, especially in Reading 
the Analects Today. Li argues that Confucius interprets external ritual as a per-
son’ own internal intention and drive, and as a result elevates social and ethical 
regulations as personal emotions and the autonomous power of decision. Ren/
humaneness, the core notion of Confucian ethics, is an emotio-rational forma-
tion of humanity, which is both governed by the rationality of ethical obligation 
and integrated with individual emotion, and the ideal personality of loving and 
helping other people. Through self-cultivation and practice, individuals can con-
trol their own destiny and realize their own personal worth by contributing to 
social and historical progress.
In addition to the term guanxi-ism, denoting both meanings of human relation-
ality and individuality, as mentioned at this article’s beginning, Li Zehou has also 
coined other novel, paired terms, such as emotio-rational formation, religious 
morality and social morality, ethics and morality, and subjectality (zhutixing 主
體性) and subjectivity (zhuguanxing 主觀性; Li 1999, 174–83). In doing so he 
has reconceptualized the Confucian project of cultivating the ideal personality 
through integrating social values with individual worth, ethical regulations with 
autonomy, and relational obligations with personal realization. 
With a certain transformative construction, Li expects, this Confucian project 
can be efficiently applied in developing humanity and reconstructing the cul-
tural order in today’s world. On the one hand, it stresses each person’s emotions, 
autonomous decisions, free development, and self-realization; on the other, it 
revises modern liberalism’s over-projection of the “atomic individual” and abso-
lute freedom while ignoring social and community interests. Externally it can 
inspire us to build social harmony and interpersonal care based on individual 
rights and interests; internally it can guide us to foster personal emotions, char-
acter, and humanity (Li 2014, 105–7, 113–17). In the end, “everything, including 
ethics and morality, eventually completes in the individual”一切包括倫理道德
最終歸結于個體 (Li 2017, 379), who can thus become fully human through 
the Confucian project of “person making” (Hall and Ames 1987, 114–25).
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